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MRS. SUMNER SPAULDING, Respondent, v. ARTHUR 
A. CAMERON, Appellant. 
[1] Waters-Surface and Flood Waters-Protection Against-
Evidence.-A finding that inundations of plaintiff's property 
with mud were caused by defendant's negligence in construct-
ing a fill is sustained by evidence that he failed to use the 
proper procedure for making stable fills although warned of 
the hazard he was thereby creating. 
[2] Id.-Nuisances.-A negligently constructed fill causing plain-
tiff's property to be inundated with mud and threatening 
repetitions thereof which, unless corrected, would compel her 
to abandon her residence thereon, constitutes a nuisance within 
Civ. Code, § 3479. 
[3] Nuisances-Remedies-Review.-In an action to abate a nui-
sance and for damages, in which the court makes an express 
finding of permanent damage to plaintiff's property based on 
the continuing threat of future injury, but also makes an 
inconsistent implied finding that the threat can be removed, 
and where it cannot be said as a matter of law whether or 
not it can, the appellate court will affirm that part of a 
judgment awarding damages for actual physical injury, but 
will reverse that part granting injunctive relief and award-
ing additional damages for loss in market value by reason 
of the continuing threat, and will direct the trial court to 
determine whether the nuisance is permanent. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Otto J. Emme, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part with instructions. 
Action for damages and for injunctive relief. Judgment 
for plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Martin H. Easton, James A. Gardner, Overton, Lyman, 
Prince & Vermille and Donald H. Ford for Appellant. 
Samuel A. Rosenthal, Prinzmetal & Grant and Leonard 
G. Ratner for Respondent. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 275; Am.Jur., Waters, § 432. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 411; [2] Waters, § 275; 
[3] Nuisances, § 64. 
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THAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff owns and occupies a house on 
the east side of San Ysidro Drive, Los Angeles, at the bot-
tom of Pea Vine Canyon. Defendant owns approximately 30 
acres of land on the west slope of the canyon. In the sum-
mer and fall of 1946 defendant undertook leveling opera-
tions on his property. These operations consisted of remov-
ing the tops of three knolls and casting the earth over the 
sides of adjoining canyons, forming fills. Approximately 
one fifth of the earth was pushed over the west side of the 
Pea Vine Canyon northwest of plaintiff's house. In Novem-
ber of 1946 as a result of heavy rains large quantities of 
mud washed out of defendant's fill, flowed down the canyon, 
surrounded plaintiff's house and inundated the garages lo-
cated on the ground level. Plaintiff brought this action for 
damages and for injunctive relief. The trial court found 
that plaintiff's property had suffered physical damage in 
the amount of $2,732.29, and that its market value had been 
reduced in the amount of $24,000 because of the continuing 
threat of future inundations of mud. It entered judgment 
for damages for both items and also ordered defendant either 
to remove the fill or to ''place protective structures around 
. . . [it] in such manner that the property of the plaintiff 
will not be endangered or threatened by the existence of 
such deposits of loose dirt.'' Defendant appeals. 
It is unnecessary to decide whether in the absence of neg-
lig·ence defendant would be liable for creating on his prop-
erty an earth fill that presented a continuing threat of in-
jury to the property below. [1] There is evidence that 
in making the fill defendant did not prepare the natural 
hillside to hold the dirt he deposited thereon, nor did he 
make use of available means to compact the earth as it was 
laid down to prevent it from washing away. Experts testi-
fied that proper procedures for making stable fills were not 
employed. Moreover, defendant was warned during the 
course of the leveling operations of the hazard being cre-
ated to the property below. Accordingly, the evidence is 
stifficient to support the finding that the inundation of plain-
tiff's property was caused by defendant's negligence in con-
structing the fill. There is also sufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding that the fill constitutes a threat of repeti-
tions of such inundations and will, unless corrected, compel 
plaintiff to abandon her residence. 
[2] On the basis of the foregoing findings it is clear that 
defendant's fill constitutes a nuisance. ( Civ. Code, § 34 79; 
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Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 6 Cal.2d 765, 774, 776 [59 
P.2d 473] ; Mcivor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal.App.2d 247, 
254 [172 P.2d 758].) Defendant contends, however, that 
the trial court erred in allowing damages for the decline in 
market value of plaintiff's property in addition to damages 
for the physical injury, particularly in view of the fact that 
it ordered the abatement of the nuisance, the continuation 
of which is the cause of the decrease in the market value. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that there is in reality 
no way in which defendant can abate the nuisance and that 
it was therefore proper for the trial court to award damages 
caused by the continuing threat of future injury. 
In early decisions of this court it was held that it should 
not be presumed that a nuisance would continue, and damages 
were not allowed for a decrease in market value caused by 
the existence of the nuisance but were limited to the actual 
physical injury suffered before the commencement of the 
action. (Hopkins v. Western Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 190, 194; 
Severy v. Central Pac. R. Co., 51 Cal. 194, 197; see, also, 
Coats v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 1 Cal.App. 441, 444-445 
[82 P. 640] .) The remedy for a continuing nuisance was 
either a suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for 
damages as new injuries occurred. Situations arose, how-
ever, where injunctive relief was not appropriate or where 
Ruccessive actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff 
or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized 
that some types of nuisances should be considered perma-
nent, and in such cases recovery of past and anticipated 
future damages were allowed in one action. (Eachus v. Los 
Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 622 [37 P. 750, 
42 Am.St.J~ep. 149] ; Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 
624, 626-628 [89 P. 599]; Rankin v. DeBare, 205 Cal. 639, 
641 /271 P. 1050] ; see McCormick on Damages, § 127, pp. 
504-505.) 
'l'he clearest case of a permanent nuisance or trespass is 
the oue where the offending structure or condition is main-
tained as a necessary part of the operations of a public 
utility. Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefi-
nite duration and since the utility by making compensation 
is entitled to continue them, it is appropriate that only 
one action should be allowed to recover for all the damages 
inflicted. It would be unfair to the utility to subject it to 
successive suits and unfair to the injured party if he were 
not allowed to recover all of his probable damages at once. 
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(See McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 
37 Harv.L.Rev. 574, 584-585.) 
A more difficult problem is presented, however, if the de-
fendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance or trespass 
but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is willing 
that it continue if he can secure full compensation for both 
past and anticipated future injuries. To attempt categori-
cally to classify such a nuisance as either permanent or not 
may lead to serious injustice to one or the other of the par-
ties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not permanent and 
sues only for past damages, he may be met with the plea 
of res judicata in a later action for additional injury if the 
court then decides the nuisance was permanent in character 
from its inception. (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 
864, 870 [137 P.2d 713] .) Similarly, if the initial injury 
is slight and plaintiff delays suit until he has suffered sub-
stantial damage and the court then determines that the nui-
sance was permanent, the defendant may be able to raise 
the defense that the statute of limitations ran from the time 
of the initial injury. (See Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 
Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625].) On the other hand, 
if the defendant is willing and able to abate the nuisance, 
it is unfair to award damages on the theory that it will 
contimi£. (See Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261, 265 [83 
P. 300] ; cf., Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 566 
[2 P.2d 790] ; Colorado P. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 218 Cal. 
559,567 [24 P.2d 495].) 
Because of these difficulties it has been recognized that 
in doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election to 
treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. (Kafka v. 
Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 752 [218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833] ; see 
Restatement, Torts, § 930; McCormick on Damages, § 127, 
p. 511 et seq.; 4 Sutherland on Damages [4th ed.] § 1046, 
p. 3874.) If the defendant is not privileged to continue 
the nuisance and is able to abate it, he cannot complain 
if the plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as dam-
ages accrue until abatement takes place. (Phillips v. City 
of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625]; Strong 
v. Sullivan, 180 Cal. 331, 334-335 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R. 
343] .) On the other hand, if it appears improbable as a 
practical matter that the nuisance can or will be abated, 
the plaintiff should not be left to the troublesome remedy 
of successive actions. (See Restatement, Torts, § 930, com-
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ment c; McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to 
Land, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 574, 594-595.) 
The facts of the present case aptly illustrate the problem 
involved. As a result of the nuisance created by defendant, 
plaintiff's property suffered physical injury. There is also 
evidence that while the nuisance continues its rental value 
is impaired, and that if the nuisance is not abated its market 
value will continue to be substantially depressed. There is 
evidence that would support the conclusion that there is 
little or nothing defendant can do to abate the nuisance. On 
the assumption that this conclusion is correct, plaintiff con-
tends that she is entitled to recover the full diminution in 
the market value caused by the probable continuation of the 
nuisance. On the other hand, defendant contends that he 
can and will abate the nuisance. There is evidence that 
would support the conclusion that corrective measures taken 
by defendant will prevent further flows of mud. Moreover, 
since defendant intends to make use of the top surface of 
the fill it is not improbable that he will do whatever is prac-
tically possible to stabilize it. On the assumption that he 
has or will be able to abate the nuisance defendant contends 
that plaintiff's damages should be limited to those suffered 
in the past and should not include speculative future losses 
based on the assumption that the nuisance will continue. 
[3] The findings and conclusions of the trial court on 
these conflicting contentions are inconsistent. The court 
found that plaintiff's property had been permanently dam-
aged because of the continuing threat of future injury. It 
also found, however, that this threat would continue unless 
corrective measures were taken, and by ordering that such 
measures be taken impliedly found that they were feasible. 
It is clear that plaintiff cannot have both remedies. If de-
fendant obeys the injunction and takes such measures that 
''the property of the plaintiff will not be endangered or 
threatened by the existence of such deposits of loose dirt,'' 
there will no longer be a threat to depreciate the value of 
the property. Plaintiff would obtain a double recovery if 
she could recover for the depreciation in value and also 
have the cause of that depreciation removed. 
A similar problem was presented in Meek v. De Latour, 2 
Cal.App. 261 [83 P. 300]. In that case plaintiff secured 
a judgment ordering the abatement of a cream of tartar 
factory and awarding damages. In compliance with the 
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judgment the factory was removed and on appeal it was 
held that evidence of the decrease in market value caused 
by its presence was inadmissible. "It seems perfectly clear 
that such testimony . . ., where the abatement of a nuisance 
is sought, is inadmissible on the question of damages. Other-
wise a plaintiff could recover for the depreciation in value 
of his property and at the same time remove the deprecia-
tion by abating the cause of it." (2 Cal.App. at 265.) 
In the present case it cannot be said as a matter of law 
that the nuisance can or cannot be abated. In view of 
the inconsistent findings and the conflict in the evidence, 
it would be inappropriate for this court to determine whether 
the nuisance is in fact permanent and to modify the judg·-
ment by striking the damages for loss of market value on 
the assumption it is not permanent, or by striking the in-
junctive provisions on the assumption that it is. (Tuprnan 
v. Habe1·kern, 208 Cal. 256, 269-270 [280 P. 970].) 
Since plaintiff has proved defendant's liability for the 
actual physical injury to the property the judgment should 
be affirmed to the extent that it awards $2,732.29 clam-
ages for that injury. To the extent that the judgment 
awards additional damages and also grants injunctive re-
lief it must be reversed. On retrial the trial court should 
determine whether or not the nuisance is in fact permanent. 
If it finds that it is, it should enter judgment for the de-
erease in market value. If it finds that it is not, it should 
grant injunctive relief and such additional damages as may 
be proved for the temporary decrease in the value of the 
use of the property while the nuisance continued. (See 
Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Cor·p., 48 Cal.App.2d 429, 437-
438 [119 P.2d 973]; Guttinger v. Calaveras Cernent Co., 105 
Cal.App.2d 382, 387 [233 P.2d 914]; McCormick on Damages, 
§ 127, pp. 503-504.) 
'fo the extent that it awards damages of $2,732.29 the 
judgment is affirmed. In all other respects the judgment 
is reversed and the eause is remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to determine on the basis of the evidence previ-
ously presented and sueh additional evidence as may be pre-
sented by the parties ~whether or not the nnisanee is in faet 
prrmanent. Eaeh party is to bear his own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Sehauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Jan. 1932] SPAUioDIXG V. CA~iERON 
[38 C.2d 265; 239 P.2d 625) 
CA:R'l'ER, J.-1 dissent. 
271 
l am of the opinion that the portion of the judgment for 
damages should be affirmed and the injunctive feature either 
amended or affirmed as correctly construed. 
In this case the defendant negligently maintained loose 
dirt on his land which has in the past, when it rained, moved 
onto plaintiff's land. The court expressly found that such 
condition existing on defendant's land permanently depre-
ciated the market value of plaintiff's land as follows: " ... 
by reason of the acts of the defendant ... plaintiff's prop-
erty has suffered a substantial and permanent 'impairment of 
value and has lost its desirability as a residence for plain-
tiff, or any prospective purchasers; that it is true that the 
fair market value of the house on plaintiff's property be-
fore the deposit of the loose dirt, and the damage occasioned 
thereby, was the sum of $40,000.00, and that the fair re-
sale value of said house after the damage caused by the 
defc"ndant ... was the sum of $16,000.00, to plaintiff's detri-
ment and damage in the sum of $24,000.00, and it is true 
that the maintenance by the defendant ... of the loose 
quantities of dirt on his premises will cause plaintiff great 
and in·epamble injury and will permanently deprive plain-
tiff's land of any value for residential purposes." (Italics 
added.) It is conceded by the majority that that finding is 
supportecl by the evidence. The majority opinion says, how-
ever, that there is an inconsistent finding to the effect that 
the condition on defendant's land is not permanent--can 
be abated. 'l'here is no e.xpress finding to that effect. As-
suming there is an implied finding flowing from the fact 
that an injunction was given, then the duty of this court 
is to liberally construe the findings to support the part of 
the judgment based upon such findings, rather than revers-
ing the entire judgment. Thus the implied inconsistent 
fillCling tl1at the condition can be abated may be ignored, 
and the part of tlw judgment awarding injunctive relirf 
rcwrsed, while affirming the damage portion which is basrd 
on an express finding of permanent damage. In line with 
the settled rule that findings must be liberally construed to 
support the judgment and specific findings control over gen-
eral ones (24 Cal.Jur. 1007 et seq.) an express finding pre-
vails over an implied one. (See Central H. Imp. Co. v. Memo-
rial Pa,rks, Inc., 40 CalApp.2d 591 [105 P.2d 596].) 
It is not neeessary, however, to reverse the injunctive pro-
vision in the judgment, for correctly construed, under the 
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rule requiring liberal construction to support it, there is 
no inconsistency. So interpreted, it enjoins only the main-
tenance in the future by defendant on his land of additional 
loose soil, that is, in addition to what is already there. The 
findings are readily susceptible of that construction. It is 
found that ''Plaintiff is entitled to a permanent restraining 
order against the defendant, enjoining ... defendant ... 
from excavating, re-surfacing or distributing his said land 
and depositing loose dirt in any manner which may threaten 
or endanger the residence of the plaintiff, and ordering the 
defendant . > • to remove deposits of loose dirt upon his 
said land, or in lieu thereof, to place protecting structures 
around said loose dirt in such a manner that the property 
of the plaintiff will not be endangered or threatened by the 
existence of deposits of loose dirt." (Italics added.) It 
will be noted that the participle form of the verbs "excavate, 
re-surface or distribute" speak in the future. It could not 
be speaking of the past because that soil had already been 
excavated and distributed. The removal of the dirt being 
in the same tenor, refers to the dirt to be distributed in the 
future, after the entry of the judgment. It is true that 
the judgment also refers to the removal of dirt theretofore 
deposited. That portion of the judgment is out of harmony 
with the findings and should be modified. > 
I would therefore modify the judgment with respect to 
injunctive relief against dirt already deposited on defend-
ant's land and affirm the judgment as so modified. 
The opinion and judgment were modified to read as above 
printed and respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied 
:F'ebruary 14, 1952. Carter, ,T., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
